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Abstract 
This research was conducted with the main objective of establishing the implementation 
mechanism available in Kenya to ensure sound corporate governance within the markets 
regulatory by assessing the level of accountability of company directors when dispensing their 
section 143 duty of promoting the success of the business as a whole. The methods of 
research adopted the use of archived information, interviews and questionnaires by specific 
groups. The underlying corporate governance theories were utilized in the study. It was 
established that  our code and governance structure and model  must be based on our national, 
economic and social environment so as to meet the needs of the Kenyan market, this is the 
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Corporate Governance is not a novel concept, up until today it is still being developed and 
improved on. The main reason for its development over the years is due to the vast number of 
fraudulent scandals and the need for deeper investor protection as well as confidence in the 
market1. The phrase has no universally accepted definition and it is for this reason that it has 
commonly been misinterpreted as the solution for all corporate ills.2 
Corporate governance comprehends a framework of rules and processes within and by which 
corporate authority is exercised and controlled for the benefit of all stakeholders.3 
Corporate governance is  the structured process used to direct business affairs of the company 
towards enhancing prosperity with the ultimate objective of realizing shareholders long-term 
value while taking into account the interest of other stakeholders.4It can also be broadly 
defined as the distribution, exercise and implications of corporate control.5 
In the past, financial scandals have shown that Kenya is unable to cope with the self-
regulation of its corporations through established corporate governance codes such as the 
Goldenberg scandal, 19936. In  2015 Uchumi fired its chief executive officer and chief 
financial officer  for "misconduct and gross negligence.”7 
Directors are key ingredients to any corporate governance system employed and as such are 
made accountable for their actions through the traditional directors' duties in common law. 
                                               
1 Dougherty T, The Political Economy Of Corporations: Varying Approaches To Corporate Governance Around 
The World,2006,256-57 
2 Young A, ‘Frameworks in Regulating Company Directors: Rethinking the Philosophical Foundations to 
Enhance Accountability’ 12 Sweet & Maxwell (2009),30 
3  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Corporate Governance: Frequently Asked 
Questions about the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’, < http://ww.oecd.org.faq/02583, 
en_2649_37439_31717413_1_1_1_3473900html> , accessed on24th November 2016 . 
4  Section 1.2,The Capital Markets Act (Cap. 485a) Guidelines On Corporate Governance Practices By Public 
Listed Companies In Kenya, (2002) 
5 Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson, Michael Wright, ‘Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and 
International Comparisons’, 2005,209 
6 Warutere P, ‘The Goldenberg Conspiracy’ 117 Institute for Security Studies Papers (2005),23 
7 Business Daily, ‘Uchumi sacks Ciano, CFO for ‘gross misconduct, negligence’, Business Daily, 15 June 2015, 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Uchumi-CEO-sacked-for-gross-misconduct--negligence/-
/539550/2752488/-/f5k06gz/-/index.html., on  24 February 2016 
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A country’s legal system plays a significant role in determining the success of its corporate 
governance system. The statutory law governing corporate governance in Kenya is contained 
in the Companies Act 2015, Capital Markets Authority Act 2002, Nairobi Stock Exchange 
(NSE) Regulations, Penal Code Section 63, Guidelines on Corporate Governance Practices by 
Public Listed Companies in Kenya among others. 
The old Companies Act 1959 had numerous loopholes8 contrastingly, the 2015 Companies 
Act, though a progression in terms of codification, has presented  a new set of problems. A 
classic and self-evident example is the direct adoption of the UK Companies Act which 
codified directors’ common law duties.   
Section 172 of the UK Act reads ‘The duty of a director to act in good faith in a way that will 
most likely promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.’9 
This section is verbatim as Section 143 of the partially enacted 2015 Companies Act. In the 
UK this section is the most controversial due to its ambiguity. It provides directors with a ‘get 
out of jail free card’10 when their actions are challenged in court. 
Additionally, our legal system is requires greater capacity building so to aid in implementing 
the law and therefore handle corporate fraud better. Currently, directors walk away without 
facing the full consequences of their actions as evidenced by the case of Rebecca Mwikali 
Nabutola v Republic.11 We need to move away from adopting shelf made foreign laws and 
instead adopt stronger legal systems which are customized to our society and will be better 
equipped to handle corporate fraud in Kenya. 
  
                                               
8 Musikal L, ‘The law affecting corporate governance in Kenya: a need for review’ International Company and 
Commercial Law Review (2008),24 
9 Section 172, UK Companies Act c 46 (2006) 
10 Keay A, ‘The duty to promote the success of the company: is it fit for purpose?’ University of Leeds School of 
Law, Centre for Business Law and Practice Working Paper (2010), 35 




Statement of the problem 
 
“The current corporate governance implementing mechanisms in Kenya are inadequate, 
leading to insufficient accountability by directors when fulfilling their duty of promoting the 
success of the company as a whole” 
 
Justification of the study 
This study is key in showing how we can better implement codes of corporate governance, 
improve our precedent on fully decided fraud cases and customize our laws to ensure they are 
suited to our needs. 
Governance practices exhibited by various scandalous companies12 have caused the low 
ranking 13for Kenya. The World Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report 
indicates a clear perception that Kenya’s investor protection and corporate governance 
framework lags behind other countries.14  
In exercise of the powers conferred by the Capital Markets Act15, the Capital Markets 
Authority set out in the corporate governance guidelines, for observance by public listed 
companies in Kenya, in order to enhance corporate governance practices but these guidelines 
are unenforceable. 
Companies Act 2015 has been partially enacted, new legislature presents an excellent 
opportunity to implement foundational law. However, section 14316 presents an opportunity 
for a drawback. If it was tried and failed in the UK can we handle the same loophole based on 
                                               
12 Goldenberg scandal, 1993;In June 2015, Uchumi; In October 2015 Imperial Bank 
13 Professor Schwab K, The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, World Economic Forum, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015-2016/Global_Competitiveness_Report_2015-2016.pdf, accessed 8 
January 2017,25 
14 Professor Schwab K, The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, World Economic Forum, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015-2016/Global_Competitiveness_Report_2015-2016.pdf, accessed 8 
January 2017 
15 Section 11(3)(v) and Section 12,Capital Markets Act (Act No. 48 of 2013) 
 
16 Section 143, Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
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our current corporate governance framework? Sections taken verbatim that have been tested 
and failed shouldn’t be incorporated into our law 
Statement of Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to establish the implementation mechanism available in 
Kenya to ensure sound corporate governance within the markets regulatory by assessing the 
level of accountability of company directors when dispensing their section 143 duty of 
promoting the success of the business as a whole.17 
Research Questions 
This research seeks to find answers on the following research questions 
a) What is the availability and adequacy of the legislative and implementation framework 
on corporate governance in Kenya? 
b) The section 143 duty ‘The duty of a director to act in good faith in a way that will 
most likely promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole’,18 is it viable in the strive for sound corporate governance in Kenya? 
Scope and Limitations of the study 
The scope of this study is limited to listed companies offering security to the public. 
Thereafter the main implementing body Capital Markets Authority, hereafter CMA, will be 
examined including the methods they use to implement the law and guidelines. The study 
faces the following limitations; 
Time 
Precision in tackling the research questions is time consuming due to the large amount of 
content on corporate governance. 
Costs of Research Resources 
Some of the research resources are costly. High transportation costs were also incurred during 
the interview period. 
                                               
17 Section 143, Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
18 Section 143, Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
 
 10 
Consent from the participants; 
The interviews being conducted require prior consent by the participants. Communicating 
with interviewees where some are not receptive; others delay in communicating, while others 
have extremely busy schedules. 
Assumptions 
1. All information given by the interviewees and participants is a true and fair 
representation of the corporate field. 
2. The materials used and relied upon haven’t been repealed or amended at the time of 
conducting the research. Indeed, law is dynamic, however an assumption made is that 
all materials are up to date. 
3. There is an assumption made that if laws are taken without customization to our 
Kenyan context and have failed in the UK then the reality will be similar here. 
4. Axiology19: The research being conducted is a qualitative analysis as opposed to a 
quantitative one. There is the assumption of underlying principles of integrity and 
good governance as values aimed at throughout the entire conduct of research. This 
isn’t a value free research; it is based on principles of morality, business ethics and 
integrity in leadership. 
 
  
                                               
19 Fischer B and Gray M, Dissertation Guides Workbook Capella University  
 Chapter 1,2009 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY. 
 
2.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Corporate governance, has over the years been developed as a response to the economic 
climate within a nation. This climate has various underlying factors which in turn shape the 
corporate governance scene. The first are the corporate governance theories. Secondly, the 
actors in the market such as directors, shareholders and stakeholders. The third is the law 
enacted, while the fourth is the body politic.20 
The chapter will commence with an in-depth analysis into the various theories that have 
developed corporate governance throughout the years, linking them with directorship duties 
specifically the section 143 duty of promoting the success of a company as a whole. 
Thereafter a look into the law primarily the CMA corporate governance guidelines, 
Directorship duties specifically section 14321and section 17222.Then finally the role that 
politics has to play in the corporate governance scene in Kenya shall be analyzed. 
2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES 
These theories act as the focal point of this proposal. They shall aid in establishing how best 
to ensure laws can be effective and suited to the Kenyan context.  
2.1.1 Agency theory: 
This theory was established by Alchian and Demsetz in 197223. It is defined as “the 
relationship between the principal shareholders and agents such as the company executives 
and managers”24 The agency theory presumes that ownership and control of the corporation 
                                               
20 Harvey A, Body politic: political metaphor and political violence Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007  
21 Section 143, Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
22 Section 172, UK Companies Act c 46 (2006) 
23 Alchian, Armen Harold D, ‘Production, information costs, and economic organization’ 62.5  The American 
economic review, (1972), 777-795. 
24 Abdullah  and Benedict V, Fundamental and Ethics Theories of Corporate Governance 4th edn EuroJournals 
Publishing, (2009), 2 
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are separate.25 The principal in this theory are the shareholders, they delegate duty and 
responsibility to the directors who are the agents. The underlying expectation of this theory is 
that the directors will act and make decisions within the realm of the principal’s interests. 
 
The principles of common law and equity sought to limit the authority that the directors in 
their capacity as agents could act, so as to minimize situations that would lead to 
opportunistic, self-interest objectives overriding the shareholders’ interests. 
 
Critiques on the agency theory 
The agency principal relationship is has received the following criticism when applied to the 
director shareholder relationship within public and private companies; 
The first, being that the theory has been criticized as being too complicated when the 
principal is an amorphous mass of unknown individuals to the directors of the business.26 The 
agency relationship is easier when both parties are easily identifiable by the other. The 
shareholders, are viewed as merely holding shares as property which is actually being 
invested in by the directors.  
 
Secondly, the agency theory is limited to operations of a single period and not a dynamic 
model. It is not viewed as realistic in a multi- period setting. Limited liability companies are 
bodies with separate legal identity from its members and managers  as identified in the 
landmark case of  Salomon v Salomon27. The separation of identity is one of the effects of 
registration of the company as outlined in the Act28 as is perpetual succession. 
 
Additionally, the assumption made that the agent and principal are both rational utility 
maximizers. The  ‘model of man’29 and the Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model 
                                               
25 Young A, ‘Frameworks in Regulating Company Directors: Rethinking the Philosophical Foundations to 
Enhance Accountability’ 12 Sweet & Maxwell (2009), 67 
26 Professor Güler A and Professor Crowther D, A Handbook of Corporate Governance and Social 
Responsibility 1 Gower Publishing Ltd, 2012, 220 
27Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22   
28 Section 19, Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
29Jensen and Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ‘Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 4 
Journal of financial economics, (1967),305-360 
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(REMM)30 acted as the underlying  principles for the agency Theory.31 The problem lies in 
the fact that these reductionist assumptions of human motivation guide both organizational 
and managerial theory building, and serve to produce behavior in the organization that is 
consistent with those assumptions.32 
 
2.1.2 Stewardship theory33 
This theory was developed by Donald and Davis in 1991.34 The main assumption it addressed 
was on the model man, reduction theory of man as a rational being as well as the static nature 
of the agency theory.  
The theory proposes that managers when left on their own will act responsibly in accordance 
with their directorship roles and duties. It looks at directors and managers as stewards of the 
company and views monitoring as redundant35.Regarding the board, superior corporate 
performance will be linked to a majority of inside directors and that the position of Chairman 
and CEO should be held by the  same person since this provides clear leadership.36 
The key assumption made under this theory is that the behavior of the directors mirrors the 
shareholders’ interests, placing primacy on the meeting of objectives by both the directors and 
the shareholders.37 
                                               
30 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 4, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320> 
31 Referred to in Appendix 2 
32 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 4, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320>founded on Ferraro et al., 2005. 
33 Wan Y and Alhaji,’Insight of corporate governance theories’ 1.1 Journal of Business and management, 
(2012),52-63. 
34 McWilliams, Abagail, Siegel D, and Patrick M, ‘Corporate social responsibility: Strategic implications’ 43.1 
Journal of management studies, (2006),1-18. 
35 Donaldson, Lex, and Davis J, ‘Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns’ 
16 Australian Journal of management, (1991), 49-64. 
36 Gakeri J, ‘Enhancing Kenya’s Securities Markets through Corporate Governance: Challenges and 
Opportunities’ 3.6 International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, (2013) 
37 Slyke, David M. ‘Agents or stewards: Using theory to understand the government-nonprofit social service 
contracting relationship’ 17.2 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,(2007),157-187. 
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Critiques on the stewardship theory 
The stewardship theory entails a physiological element on the part of the directors. The 
commitment and use of personal power as a basis of influence is subjective.38 It is influenced 
by his/her  cultural background.  
Additionally, the problem arises when there are conflicting forces between the psychological 
and the situational factors the director faces. There may arise a mismatch between the 
management philosophy of the company which may be more inclined towards the agency 
theory and the psychological characteristics of the manager remains rather unexplored under 
current stewardship theory. 
Third, the assumption made in becoming a steward has been an area of critique.39 The 
assumption is  that becoming a steward or an agent is the result of a purely rational 
process.40The questions that then arise are; How can an individual rationally decide whether 
his nature is that of a steward or an agent? and What role does motivation play in this picture? 
2.1.3 The other major theories: 
2.1.3.1 Stakeholder theory 
This theory addresses the concept of the "principle of who or what really counts".41 Unlike the 
agency theory that doesn’t include other stakeholders apart from the shareholder of the 
company, this theory incorporates the interests of other parties who have an equally important 
interest in the company. 
This theory is seen in the section 143 duty under subsection 1(c) directors ought to ensure the  
need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers, creditors and  
                                               
38 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 3, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320> 
39 Refer to Appendix 3 
40 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 4, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320> 
41 Freeman, Edward and McVea, ‘A stakeholder approach to strategic management’ 1.2 Darden Business School 
Working Paper (2001),28 
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others.42 Additionally, in the same section the interest of the community and environment are 
to be factored in, which is further evidence of the stakeholder theory underlying  statute.43 
According to this theory, benefit is maximized if the business is operated by management on 
behalf of all the stakeholders and the returns are in turn divided among the stakeholders in an 
acceptable manner to all.44This theory mainly features in the corporate governance structure 
adopted in the German and Japanese financial markets. 
Critiques on the stakeholder theory 
The main critique is on the manner of division of the returns. The theory stipulates that the 
division ought to be in a manner acceptable by all stakeholders within the realm of the 
company45. However, a universal mechanism hasn’t been developed or stipulated by this 
theory on how returns are to be divided in a way that is accepted by all stakeholders. This 
leaves lee ways for ambiguity and accounting discrepancies.  
2.1.3.2 Managerial hegemony: 
In contrast to agency theory is what is sometimes called managerial hegemony theory.46This 
relates back to the thesis of Berle and Means (1932)47 that although shareholders may legally 
own and control large corporations they no longer effectively control them. Control having 
being effectively ceded to a new professional managerial class.48  In this theory the directors 
view themselves as an elite class, a club that is exclusive and lacks transparency. The criteria 
for appointment of directors into the elite class is based on taking into account how he or she 
                                               
42 Section 143(1)(c), Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
43 Section 143(1)(c), Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
44Professor Güler A and Professor Crowther D, A Handbook of Corporate Governance and Social 
Responsibility 1 Gower Publishing Ltd, 2012, 219 
45 Professor Güler A and Professor Crowther D, A Handbook of Corporate Governance and Social 
Responsibility 1 Gower Publishing Ltd, 2012, 219 
46 Hung H, ‘A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards’ 6.2 Corporate governance, (1998),101-
111 
47 Berle, Adolf A and Gardiner C, Means.’The modern corporation and private property’ (1968):,204 
48 Cornforth C, “Power relations between boards and senior managers in the governance of 
Public and non-profit organizations”, 2nd International Conference on Corporate Governance and 
Direction,Henley Management College, UK, 13-15 October 1999, <http://oro.open.ac.uk/15399/> 
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may best fit into the elite and this factor often times overrides the knowledge, experience and 
skills that he may or may not have to offer the company.49 
This theory is closely associated with the political scene in Kenya. This theory is criticized for 
its lack of transparency and narrow view on the success of the company by directors. 
Examples are in Enron, Jeffrey Skilling, 50 his motivation was near sighted and in the end led 
to the crash of the century leading to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.51 
2.1.3.3Resource dependency52: 
The basic proposition of resource dependence theory is the need for environmental linkages 
between the firm and outside resources. In this perspective, directors serve to connect the firm 
with external factors by co-opting the resources needed to survive; therefore, boards of 
directors are an important mechanism for absorbing critical elements of environmental 
uncertainty into the firm.53 
Our current legislature uses a bit of all the above theories however the most dominant being 
the agency and stewardship theory.  
2.2 THE LAW ON DIRECTORSHIP DUTIES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE. 
Implementing mechanisms focus on directors to ensure that they perform their duties and 
obligations. This paper aims at assessing if the director can indeed dispense his statutory 
section 14354 duty in a manner in tune with corporate governance principles.  
THE COMPANIES ACT No. 17 of 2015 
The extent to which directors are able to divide and delegate their responsibilities was seen as 
ambiguous hence the development of directorship duties.55 These duties have recently been 
                                               
49 Hung H, ‘A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards’ 6.2 Corporate governance, (1998),101-
111 
50 Gibney Alex, Enron: The Smartest Guys In The Room,2005 
51 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Washington DC (2002) 
52 Jensen and Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ‘Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 4 
Journal of financial economics, (1967),305-360 
53 Jensen and Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ‘Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 4 
Journal of financial economics, (1967),305-360 
54 Section 143(3), Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
55 Refer to Appendix 4, comprehensive list of director’s duties 
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conceptualized within the 2015 Companies Act of Kenya, it  replicated  2006 UK Companies 
Act.56 
Consequently, Section 143 of the Act as shown above expresses the directors’ duty to 
promote the success of the company due to this pressing need for company survival and 
prosperity. The same section was acquired from the UK Companies Act section 172. A 
comparative is shown in Appendix 1 of how this section was taken verbatim despite the 
loopholes it has created at the point of implementation in the UK jurisdiction. 
The law on directorship duties and its efficacy in the Kenyan context will be viewed through 
the Uchumi case study in Chapter 3. 
CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES FOR ISSUERS OF 
SECURITIES TO THE PUBLIC 2015 
Notably, the above Kenyan code, forms guidelines on how directors ought to behave. It 
suggests behavior that is in tune with corporate governance principles and in ensuring its 
mandate is met it has moved away from the “comply or explain” approach to “apply or 
explain”. This new approach is principle-based rather than rule-based, and recognizes that a 
satisfactory explanation for any non-compliance will be acceptable in certain circumstances.  
Effective corporate governance requires a board composed of qualified and competent 
members capable of exercising objective and independent judgment, and focused on guiding 
strategy development and monitoring management. A proper understanding of the role and 
responsibilities of the board must be shared not only by members of the Board, but also by 
company executives and external stakeholders, to ensure that the Board has appropriate 
autonomy, authority, and accountability in exercising its functions and that it can be held 
accountable by stakeholders.57 
The directors of each company shall be responsible of formulating policies and guidelines in a 
manner in which all their management decisions are made in accordance with prudent 
corporate governance practices. This responsibility as set out in the code is a statutory 
                                               
56 Section 170 (4), UK Companies Act c 46 (2006), refer to appendix 1 
57 Part II, Chapter 2, Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public (2015) 
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obligation placed on directors that mirrors how they ought to act when making decisions that 
ultimately are aimed at the success of the company as a whole.58 
Additionally, the code gives guidelines on the need for transparency when the company 
undertakes procedures of appointment, composition, size and qualifications of board 
members. In light of the strive for sound corporate governance in line with the set directors’ 
duties appointment, composition, size and qualifications of directors on the board are key 
areas of focus. 
The entire code has not been made mandatory only a few provisions are mandatory if seen to 
replicate the Capital Markets Regulations, 200259 that aim to safeguard the interests of 
stakeholders. These guidelines will be used in assessing the Uchumi scandal which will be 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
2.3 THE BODY POLITIC INSTITUTION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
The practice of corporate governance doesn’t occur in a vacuum, alongside the law and 
regulatory bodies lies the body politic. Body politic means is a  body of a political nature that 
comprises of a single group of people  at the  top of government and the head of state.60 This 
body according to prescription of the term acts as an institution within itself. In Kenya politics 
plays a major role in the corporate sector. In some instances, this body may be seen to exceed 
its mandate and interfere instead of intervene within the self-regulatory free market. 61 
 
One of the principal instruments  by which a government is held accountable is through a free 
and fair democratic election process62. This process then allows for separation of powers 
between arms of government and oversight by independent regulatory bodies to ensure 
transparency and efficiency.  For corporate governance to thrive within the market, it is 
essential for a country to have a stable political institution and government. 
                                               
58 Part I, Section 1.1.6, Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public (2015) 
59 Capital Markets (Securities)(Public Offers, Listing and Disclosures)Regulations (2002) 
60 Harvey AD , Body politic: political metaphor and political violence,Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007,54 
61 Araniya, Isukul, Chizea, ‘Environmental Factors Influencing Corporate Governance 
The Nigerian Reality’ Creative Commons SAGE and Open Access, 
<http://www.uk.sagepub.com/aboutus/openaccess.htm>, SSRN 2615564,2015, 4 




In relation to this study, the government makes the laws, rules, and regulations that shape, 
influence, and affect corporate governance practices. At the same time, it is also involved in 
monitoring compliance to the laws and regulations.63 
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE OF A NATION 
Corruption can be regarded as an unsustainable practice that increases running costs of 
government and business enterprise, it endangers and threatens fair competition and can cause 
large distortions to economic growth.64Corruption can be classified into three distinctive 
categories: 
Political corruption when politicians take bribes using their positions of power, bureaucratic 
corruption occurs when officials take bribes, and grand corruption meaning misuse of public 
power by heads of states, ministers, and top officials for private, pecuniary profit.65 
 
Alford Roger posited that corruption is a broken window that signals the breakdown of 
community controls necessary for the maintenance of social order66. A government that 
abuses its power for private gain is a government that cannot be trusted to pursue the general 
welfare of its citizens. 
 
Empirical evidence confirms  that corruption negatively alters the public’s perception of 
government and society.67 It hampers sustainable development, which greatly impacts the 
nature of business operations and the level of business efficiency in a nation.68 
 
There is a strong relationship between corporate governance and corruption, countries with 
deficient corporate governance practices and low levels of compliance to these standards by 
                                               
63 Caddy J, ‘Why citizens are central to good governance.’Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. The OECD Observer, (2001),59  
64 Araniya, Isukul, Chizea, ‘Environmental Factors Influencing Corporate Governance The Nigerian Reality’ 
Creative Commons SAGE and Open Access,2015 
65 Lund C, ‘Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa’Cambridge university Press,(2008),10 
66 Alford,’A broken windows theory of international corruption’ 73.5  Ohio state law journal,(2012), 1253. 
67 Alford and Roger P, ‘A Broken Windows Theory of International Corruption’ 572 Ohio State Law Journal, 
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firms breed corruption leading to a wide range of transparency dilemmas as witnessed in the 
Uchumi scandal. 
 
In a developing country such as Kenya, corruption is considered a serious issue affecting 
corporate governance practices.69 Unethical practices such as bribery and corruption have 
become the norm, weakening corporate governance structures  in Kenya70, this consequently 
creates an unconducive environment where business fails to thrive. Furthermore, it 
encourages gross violation of the rule of law, business norms, through corporate and political 
impunity.71  
                                               
69 Adegbite, E, ‘ A scrutiny of corporate governance: Abridged paper’, 2.1 Journal of the Society for Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria, (2010) 242-265. 
70 Ahunwan, B, ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria’ 37.3 Journal of Business Ethics, (2002),269.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 THE RISE AND FALL OF UCHUMI SUPERMARKETS. 
 BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this chapter will involve an in depth analysis into the corporate scandal of 
Uchumi Ltd. This scandal presents a unique set of facts that would provide a practical 
interplay between the aforementioned theories of corporate governance, politics and directors 
duties when breached. Additionally, the scandal provides an opportunity to examine the 
implementing mechanism of the CMA in the event a director breaches his obligations to his 
shareholders. 
THE HISTORY OF UCHUMI SUPERMARKET LTD. 
Uchumi Supermarkets is a supermarket chain based in Kenya. The retail supermarkets have 
been in operation since 1976. It was founded by Uchumi Shareholders-Industrial Commercial 
& Development Corporation (ICDC), Kenya Wine Agencies Limited (KWAL) and Kenya 
National Trading Corporation (KNTC). These organizations were parastatals, they formed a 
contract with Uchumi supermarkets limited and henceforth became privy to a management 
contract with the Italian company; Standa SPA.  
 
In the 2000’s, Uchumi begun experiencing financial and operational hurdles. The rate of 
expansion became unmanageable. This was mainly attributed to the poor level of strategic 
planning and the weak internal control systems. 72 
 
In 2005, Uchumi closed 10 of its perennially loss making branches. It was in the same year 
that the company managed to raise Kshs 1.2 billion in a successful rights issue, but majority 
shareholders reduced most of their shareholding from 52% to less than 20%.73 In  2006, 
Uchumi was at a negative bottom line and by the end of 2008, Uchumi returned a profit of 
                                               
72 NIC Securities, ‘Uchumi Supermarkets Investor Note’, 30th May 2011, 
http://younginvestors.co.ug/docs/report-uchumi_investor_note.pdf, accessed on 1st January 2017. 
73 Uchumi Supermarkets Limited,‘The History of Uchumi Supermarkets’, 
http://kenya.uchumicorporate.co.ke/about-us/history, retrieved 13th August 2016. 
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Kshs 106 million against a loss of Kshs 257 million.74 It was with the help of its lending 
bankers that the receivership was lifted and it resulted in having Uchumi Supermarkets 
Limited relisted on the Nairobi Securities Exchange on 31st May 2011.75 
 
 UCHUMI AFTER 2011 
After the 2011 re-listing, Uchumi tried staying afloat without sufficient resources.76 In 2014, 
they did not pay dividends to their shareholders. From 2014, henceforth they operated under 
negative values as they tried to keep their capital afloat. It is from this year henceforth, when 
the case study proves to be most influential. The senior management and directors of the 
company, displayed impunity, disregard for their investors, shareholders and stakeholders’ 
interests. They breached their fiduciary and common law duties towards the company. A 
comprehensive breakdown of the case follows at this juncture. 
ANALYSIS OF THE UCHUMI CASE 
 FACTS AND ISSUES 
Conflict of Interest 
The senior management became the lead suppliers. This led to exaggeration of the cost of 
supplies as the drive for self-interest took over. The directors pushed their own interests above 
those of the company advocating for a higher buying price than selling price. Chief Executive 
Officer Jonathan Ciano and his chief financial officer Chadwick Okumu77 as well as five past 
directors and board members were involved  in the retailer’s financial mismanagement. A 
forensic audit conducted by audit firm KPMG revealed that Mr. Ciano’s wife was a supplier 
of fresh produce raising the conflict of interest. 
 
Fraudulent Books of Accounts 
The audit also revealed that the company mislead the CMA and several of its stakeholders and 
investors as to the state of their financial accounts. The figures presented to the public were 
                                               
74 “Uchumi Supermarkets Investors Note”, NIC securities, May 2011. 
75 "The History of Uchumi Supermarkets", http://kenya.uchumicorporate.co.ke/about-us/history, retrieved 13th 
August 2016. 
76 The numerical representation of the financial health of the firm is provided for in Appendix 6. 
77 Bernard Mwinzi, Daily Nation, ‘Audit puts Ciano on the spot over Uchumi troubles’,March 2016 
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not a fair and true representation of the company’s status during the rights issue they 
conducted in 2014.The figures presented to the Nairobi Securities exchange and shareholders 
was Kshs. 262 million in loss but the true figure was established to be 1.9 billion78.   Uchumi 
booked in a Kshs. 3.2 billion loss in the financial year ending June 201679 after the company 
wrote off the Kshs. 1.04 billion debt that had been accumulated due to manipulation of the 
books. The company used a revaluation of its properties so as to conceal the losses they made 
in 2014.80 
Fraudulent Prospectus 
The directors also failed their duties to their shareholders when they issued a fraudulent 
prospectus. The company included assets that they had already sold off to Rent Co. It is stated 
in the KPMG report as follows: 
“From our view, members of the Board were aware of the transaction and the reporting 
accountants Ernst & Young had captured this transaction in their management letter for the 
audit of the year ended June 30, 2014 and dated September 18, 2014, and were therefore 
aware of this deal and its implications,”81 
 
Non-conformity with prescribed rules of procedure and operations 
The KPMG audit report indicated the high level of non-conformity to background and quality 
checks required by law for all players in the industry so as to ensure consumer 
protection.82This  led to the high level of acceptance of dubious agreements, suppliers with a 
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conflict of interest and substandard products. Additionally, over 45%83 of the procurement 
staff did not meet the threshold set in the Human resource guidelines. Uchumi, therefore dealt 
with suppliers who had a conflict with the company and even made agreements that lacked 
good faith. 
The board lacked oversight seeing as they didn’t appear for most meetings, failed to approve 
multiple transactions leaving Mr. Ciano with authority that went over his capacity as CEO.84 
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LAW 
Conflict of Interest 
As prescribed by the Companies Act 2015, the general duties of directors are based on 
common law rules and equitable principles.85The directors duty to avoid a conflict of interest 
is clearly outlined in statute under Section 146 of the Companies Act 2015.86The directors 
ought to ensure that they avoid a situation in which they have a direct or indirect conflict with 
the interest of the company.  
Additionally, the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity. This duty can be 
infringed by the directors of public companies only in the event that the company’s 
constitution includes a provision enabling the directors to give such an authorization and the 
directors comply with the requirements of the provision. A director who doesn’t disclose a 
conflict of interest that he may have he is liable to a fine not exceeding one million shillings.87 
 
Fraudulent Books of Accounts and Prospectus. 
Fraud is defined as willful misrepresentation of the truth with intent to deceive by one party 
resulting in actual or potential loss to another party or illegitimate gain to the fraudster. This 
includes fraudulent sale of client shares, Insider trading, market manipulation, stealing of 
client funds, and manipulation of client records among other offences.88 
 
The CMA has the mandate of ensuring investor protection. Under Section 11 of the Act89, the 
authority is mandated with the duty to ensure that the markets are free from impediments so 
as to boost investor confidence. This is done by ensuring that the participants of the market 
are authenticated by meeting the set checks and balances as well as the regulatory framework. 
The CMA formed a body known as the Capital Market Fraud and Investigations Unit 
(CMFIU). The body was formed in May 2009 through collaboration by the Kenya Police and 
                                               
85 Section 140(3), Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
86 Section 146, Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
87 Section 151(10), Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
88 Capital Markets Authority ,'CMFIA Background' 
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Capital Markets Authority (CMA) with a view of consolidating the investigations of all 
securities related fraud cases.90Its core function is detection, prevention and apprehension of 
offenders perpetrating fraud within the Securities Market. The standard of proof for sustaining 
successful prosecution of persons suspected of criminal offences is generally submission of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Penalties range from fines of up to 
Ksh15,000,000.00 or a jail term of up to 7 years.91 
Non-conformity with prescribed rules of procedure and operations. 
This could have been avoided if general rules of governance were adhered to such as 
transparency, accountability and oversight92 due to clear separation of powers among those in 
the board. The board lacked transparency which is prescribed under Chapter 7 of the Code of 
Corporate Governance. Indeed, transparency and disclosure are crucial for the market-based 
monitoring of companies and are central to a shareholder’s ability to exercise his or her 
ownership rights.93 
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APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
As regards the conflict of interest, the law is clear on the need for directors to avoid a conflict 
of interest whether direct or indirect, failure to do so attracts a fine of not less than Kshs. One 
million. The directors must act in good faith and thus  promotes the success of the company 
and is for the benefit of the members as a whole.94 
They did not abide by the agency or stakeholder theory that acts as a backbone on how the 
directors ought to conduct themselves when attending to the affairs of the business and  they 
didn’t exercise independent judgement nor devote sufficient time to carry out their 
responsibilities and enhance their skills.95 
The CMA as the regulator indeed has the mandate to protect all users of the market and boost 
investor confidence in the market. A failure on their part to detect the fraudulent activity of 
Uchumi shows the level of inefficiency the authority has. There exists the CMFIU which 
before accepting the offer of the Uchumi rights issue in 2014 would have been used to 
establish the true and fair position of Uchumi.  The law is clear on the fine amount or jail time 
of 7 years when fraud is confirmed. 
 DECISION MADE BY THE CMA 
The CMA, after conducting investigations too action against the flowing perpetrators and 
imposed the following sanctions: 
Against Mr. Jonathan Ciano, the regulator imposed a Sh5 million fine and is currently still 
seeking to recover Sh13.5 million from him as profit from illegally supplying Uchumi with 
goods. Additionally, he was banned from serving in any capacity for a listed firm for a time 
cap of 5 years.96He was however cleared over the invoiced payments transacted by his wife 
when supplying the company. According to CMA, they found that he had not in fact disclosed 
the fact that had a conflict of interest to the other directors and was therefore culpable of 
misleading the board and shareholders of Uchumi’s true financial position that eventually led 
                                               
94 Section 143, Companies Act (Act No.17 of 2015) 
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to its collapse. The Authority additionally lodged a complaint against him for the start of a 
disciplinary hearing by the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK). 
The CMA also fined former Chief Financial Officer Chadwick Okumu, board directors James 
Murigu, Bartholomew Ragalo as well as chairperson Khadija Mire. Mr. Okumu was 
disqualified from holding office as a CFO, director or key officer of a public listed company 
and/or issuer, licensee or any approved institution of the Authority for a period of two years. 
He too, got a complaint lodged against him for the start of a disciplinary hearing by the 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK). 
Ms. Mire, was disqualified from holding any position in a public company, and the CMA 
sought to recover about Sh1.77 million97 which was paid as board allowances between 2014 
and 2015.Additionally, the CMA directed her to attend Corporate Governance Training to be 
eligible for appointment as a director in a listed company in future. 
Moreover, the CMA held the entire board accountable for lacking oversight into the affairs of 
the business as is their prescribed mandate. In relation to the fraudulent rights issue that 
caused a tainted image of the finances of the company to potential investors Faida Investment 
Bank, which was the lead transaction advisor for Uchumi’s rights issue, was suspended from 
offering transaction advisory services for a period of six months. 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AS PER 
UCHUMI CASE STUDY. 
What is the availability and adequacy of the legislative and implementation framework on 
corporate governance in Kenya? 
Corporate governance guidelines and recommendations are all outlined in the Capital Markets 
Act and the Code of Corporate Governance as all clearly outlined above, the issue that points 
to the focal point of this research is how is the statute then implemented? 
In the case of Dav Ciano, the sanctions given included a fine that totaled up to 
Kshs.18.5million. This was based on an order to repay the amount illegally provided for in 
supplies and acquiring the profits illegally. Implementation is about transparency, 
predictability that upon breaching the law the consequences are certain since they are clearly 
prescribed in the law. 
Fraudulent behavior according to the CMFIA warrants penalties that range from fines of up to 
Ksh15,000,000.00 or a jail term of up to 7 years.98 
The CMA prescribes 99 that the it may in liaison with the  Nairobi Stock exchange, remand, 
fine, suspend, expel or discipline the subject person. 
Additionally The Authority establishes under section 35A of the Act, the Capital Markets 
Tribunal.100 Any dispute or difference which may arise between the holders, fund manager, 
trustee or the board of directors as the case may be, is handled by this tribunal. According to 
the Act, The Tribunal shall have power to award the costs of any proceedings before it and to 
direct that costs shall be paid in accordance with any scale prescribed for suits in the High 
Court or to award a specific sum as costs101. Additionally, the Tribunal shall regulate its own 
procedure.102 Despite the wide discretion the Tribunal is statutorily provided, it has failed in 
its mission of ensuring that white collar crime is efficiently prosecuted. 
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The only known case that showed the potential to act as a deterrent was that of Rebecca 
Mwikali Nabutola v Republic103 This criminal case was held in the High Court where it was 
brought for further appeal. 
Rebecca, to defraud contrary to Section 317 of the Penal Code among others.104The Ethics 
and Anti-Corruption judge argued out that for corporate crime the only punishment that can 
effectively act as a deterrent is that of jail without an option of bail. This decision by Judge L. 
Nyambura was stern and up unit the appeal Ms. Rebecca Nabutula served a jail term of about 
4 years. 
This case shows that the judiciary has the capacity to implement the law in the fight against 
corruption, however this has been a win among many loses. 
The CMA Tribunal has so far shown no progress in the fight against white collar crime and 
the compliance towards the upholding of codes of sound corporate governance. The Uchumi 
scandal was a clear indication of the inefficiencies in the way the Authority conducts its 
operations. 
Analysis of the section 143 duty ‘The duty of a director to act in good faith in a way that will 
most likely promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.?’
105
 
The section 143, duty is one that if poorly monitored can indeed promote the non- conviction 
of directors who are culpable for white collar crimes. The duty is one recently passed in 
statute and was not in place at the time of the Uchumi Scandal. However, if enforced it is a 
loophole that may be used by the fraudulent Directors such as Ciano, to evade all culpability. 
According to the history of Uchumi as provided, before Jonathan Ciano the company was 
financially unhealthy, they recorded great losses. Jonathan Ciano, upon taking over salvaged 
the company making it seem as though his level and capacity of governance was indeed 
promoting the success of the company as he acted in good faith to benefit the members of 
Uchumi as a whole. 
‘Success’ is an ambiguous term, it may be taken to be subjective. In the UK this section is the 
most controversial due to its ambiguity. It has in the UK’s jurisdiction provided directors with 
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a ‘get out of jail free card’106 when their actions are challenged in court. The UK’s jurisdiction 
is one that we mirror due to their judicial progression and stability. Mirroring an already 
faulty law in the UK may cause even greater damage to a nation tainted with impunity and 
high levels of corruption. 
Indeed, this success though seen as ambiguous by numerous authors, the major proponent 
being Andrew Keay, has been limited by the Act. 
Decisions directors adopt must comply with the statutory provisions outlined in the Act. Such 
provisions entail the need to factor in long term consequences, employee interests, act fairly 
with shareholders and other members of the company and the secondary environment.107 The 
section 143 duty108 sets a further limitation on the nature of decisions that a director as agent, 
may take when faced with adopting transactions whose  purposes isn’t directly aimed at the 
benefit of the shareholders. In the event that this happens, subsection (1) acts as the overriding 
section.109 Subject to the Act, the section imposes a duty on directors in certain circumstances 




The CMA as regulator needs to ensure that there is proper regulation of the market by 
ensuring that all market participants comply with the Capital Markets Act as well as the Code 
of Corporate Governance. In order to effectively prosecute perpetrators of white collar crime, 
the functions, authority and competence of the CMA along with the Tribunal need revisal. 
Their prosecutorial and investigative powers require skilled personnel to effectuate and thus 
mitigate corporate fraud.   
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is the presentation of the data collected from the archived 
information, interviews and questionnaires given to the sample selected. The chapter will be 
organized into three parts: Presentation of the data; Explanation of the information acquired; 
and finally a summary of the major findings. The chapter provides the findings in relation to 
the study centered around implementation of corporate governance guidelines in Kenya. A set 
of questions were prepared for a number of people within the market who represent the 
regulator, the investors, or are in a position of leadership or directorship. The data collected 
was through interviews, questionnaires and literature review. 
Presentation of data 
Research Methodology 
The methods of research adopted the use of archived information, interviews and 
questionnaires by specific groups. The underlying corporate governance theories were utilized 
in the study.  
Sample selection 
The choice of groups will be chosen according to those affected by the adherence or evasion 
of the principles of good governance by the managerial sect. 
The sample selection will include Professor Gituro Wainaina, a former director in the CMA 
and currently a Director of the Social and political pillar under the Vision 2030 Delivery, 
second is Mr Kabage Karanja , the Group Chairman of Pacific Insurance Brokers (EA) Ltd 
and several other boards in the public and private sector, the third is Mr. Francis Kang'ata 
Kiragu, previously the Marketing and Corporate Sales Manager in Uchumi Ltd, and finally, a 
former head legal officer of Uchumi Supermarkets Limited. 
Assignment 
The people in the above sample selection were chosen on the basis of the years held within 
the corporate field, the amount of exposure the participants have had in relation to gross 
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misconduct of those in governance positions and their years of practice in law or policy 
making. 
FINDINGS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL UTILIZED IN 
KENYA 
The self-regulatory model that our markets utilize is not the most effective way of regulating 
the markets, indeed for such a model to work a culture of honesty ought to be engrained. 
“Our nation is engrained with impunity and the only way companies can indeed comply with 
the set principle of corporate governance is to make it compulsory. We cannot benchmark our 
level of compliance with an honest economy such as the UK, and as far as adopt their model 
of corporate governance it cannot work in our economy.”111The interviewees as well as 
archived in formation presented two models of corporate governance. The Anglo-Saxon 
model and the German model of corporate governance. 
ANGLO-SAXON MODEL 
This model is characterized by the dominance in the company of independent persons and 
individual shareholders. The manager is responsible to the Board of Directors and 
shareholders, the latter being especially interested in profitable activities and received 
dividends.112 
The Code is complied with  on a voluntary basis, however the important standards for listed 
companies are set by the UK Corporate Governance Code, which is issued as an appendix to 
the Listing Rules.113 This is a development made from the previous “tick box system" of  the 
Cadbury Code 1992. 114 The Code successfully works within the United Kingdom capital 
markets due to their pro- capitalistic drive for self-regulation of the market, a preposition 
posited by Adam Smith centuries ago where there is minimal interference by the state.  
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Rationale behind the self-regulatory/voluntary principle in the Anglo-Saxon Model. 
The voluntary principle has generally worked in the United Kingdom because it was based on 
a consensus agreed between corporations and the Authority, it is due to this mutually agreed 
upon consensus that firms are compelled to observe the code of corporate governance. One 
may attribute this to their principled culture and level of development as a nation. The 
rationale behind this model is because of a number of reasons: its flexibility, if mandatory 
companies would have minimal effects on the operations of the company,115expert personnel 
customized to understand the market and the best way to approach efficient regulation116 and 
the agencies are smaller and more cohesive thus work in an efficient manner that minimizes  
information asymmetry and reduces the costs incurred in mandatory.117 
Despite the above advantages for this model it has its shortfalls. The main weakness lies in 
implementation of the Code by the agencies on all the market participants to ensure the 
standards are kept competitive, the investors are protected and the Board of Directors protects 
the Shareholders and the Stakeholders and secondly, their leniency on director’s who have 
breached their statutory duties as opposed to professionals.118 
The Anglo-Saxon Self-Regulation Model in Kenya and its effectiveness. 
Kenya being a past English protectorate implemented most of the nation’s governance 
policies. Due to its success it was adopted in Kenya in 1999.119 
In Kenya, the corporate governance code is formed from the private sector. It is then 
supervised by the Nairobi Securities Exchange and the Capital Markets Authority. The rules 
state that a company must issue a statement of compliance together with their annual 
report.120The effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s corporate Governance model was hinged 
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on the following reasons prior to their adoption by the CMA for the Kenyan Capital 
Markets:121 
The first, was that the model avoided the resort to courts in the event that a market participant 
is non-compliant to the Code. The code is not mandatory and as such doesn’t legally bind the 
company. The CMA would use a specially created tribunal, that would oversee the resolution 
of disputes within the Capital Markets and would therefore be the effective vehicle of dispute 
resolution. 
Secondly, the model was seen as flexible in that in comparison to the German’s use of 
statutory regulation, ‘command and control’. This level of flexibility allows for ease in 
amending the Code when the market develops in an aspect that was unforeseeable at the 
drafting period, it additionally adapts to various cultures and institutional frameworks within 
the market.122 
Moreover, the Kenyan market is largely composed of small and medium sized 
companies(SME’s). They are seen to be the  most prolific sources of employment in 
Kenya.123  With majority of the market falling under SME’s  policy provisions adopted by the 
CMA for market participants would need to be favorable to the SME sector so as to boost 
their operations and consequently boost the country’s economy.124 
The introduction of the comply and control principle as depicted in the German model would 
be viewed to discourage many SME’s from venturing into market and being listed in the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange due to the high levels of disclosure and scrutiny by the Capital 
Markets Authority. 
Third, the model would be less costly at compliance and procedural level. The resultant effect 
would be an easier and shorter time frame taken to implement the code due to the consensus 
to only involve industry participants and the regulator. Given the high levels of corruption in 
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Kenya, the fact that there would be lower government involvement translates to this model 
eventually lowering the level of corruption.125 
Despite these advantages and benefits seen to accrue from adopting the Anglo- Saxon model 
the level of compliance shown by market participants within the Kenyan market has been low. 
Through a report done by the Financial Standard Foundation, the level of compliance to 
principles of corporate governance was seen to be below the average standard of OECD 
principles. Standard compliance with the code was rated ‘very low’ in Kenya and Tanzania by 
the Financial Standard Report of 2008.126 
In 2015, the Economic Freedom Index of  Kenya127  indicated  that the economic freedom to 
do business in Kenya was unfree due to an unfavorable assessment of compliance with 
corporate governance codes, the rule of law, corruption and a poor judiciary.  
In  the 2016  Doing Business survey, Kenya was ranked 115th among 189 countries and 17th 
among the 47 Sub- Saharan Africa countries for protection of minority investors in 
governance.128  When drafting the  new compliance approach in the 2015, Corporate 
Governance Code, the voluntary principle was still present showing that yet again we are 
relying heavily on the Anglo-Saxon model.129The reasons why the code isn’t working in 
Kenya were found to be as follows: 
Weak monitoring and supervision. 
In Kenya, efforts have been taken to ensure   that the code is implemented in companies. An 
example is the Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust (PSCGT). This Trust trains 
shareholders on their role and significance in the corporate governance web within the 
market.  
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“The trend is that individuals go through corporate governance training as a form of ticking 
the box and then thereafter acting in a manner contrary to the entire objective of the training. 
It is critical that the appointing authority regulates the entry point carefully. There ought to 
be a requisite disposition set so as to have a quality board of directors who are qualified for 
the position. Once you sort out your entry gate the success of the company in line with 
corporate governance principles will be effectuated.”130   
Weak Stakeholders and shareholders 
The poorly informed shareholders and stakeholders lack the capacity to hold the directors 
accountable when they breach their common law and statutory duties. This is due to the fact 
that they lack the pre-requisite investor knowledge on the affairs of the market or their rights 
ass stakeholders and shareholders of the company. 
Consequently, the shareholders do not apply sufficient pressure on directors to perform their 
duties.131  In the UK and USA, the main reason for compliance is due to the fact that 
consumers, employees and investors are able and capable of applying pressure on director to 
ensure that the Code of corporate governance is complied with.132 
The application of such pressure is done through screening of potential companies by 
investors and advocacy which is the use of the shareholders’ vote within the corporate 
meeting to compel the firm to comply with the code.133Both are not practiced heavily in 
Kenya.  
The high level of unemployment in Kenya. 
In Kenya unemployment is a national issue that has been present for a long time. In 
comparison with developed countries this is not the case. The Kenyan market pushes for self-
regulatory mechanisms so as to ensure that the market is easily accessible to employees. “It 
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makes it extremely difficult in such an economic climate for an employee to appropriately 
react to issues of corporate governance where in the event they bring non-compliance of the 
firm to the attention of the Authority they risk losing their jobs.”134 
Fragmentation of levels of enforcement. 
The institutional framework in Kenya is fragmented. There exists multiple enforcement 
players as opposed to a sole independent regulator with sufficient mandate and authority to 
implement corporate governance principles. Corporations find themselves subject to the rules 
and regulations of the Central Bank of Kenya, The Capital Markets Authority and the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange. The Kenya institute of Directors, was also created to serve as an overall 
organization for oversight and implementation the code. 
“The framework that exists, is inadequate and lacks cohesiveness in the manner the various 
agencies and institutions ought to co-relate so as to effectively and efficiently dispense their 
duties. The resultant effect is that the weak level of enforcement of the Code has led to a 
complicated system and lack of transparency. This is evidenced by the lack of judicial 
precedent on Kenya on convicted persons charged with corruption and economic crime 
within the capital markets. The  CMA tribunal  has been  described to be an institution that 
has simply ticked the compliance box.”135 
Limited resources 
In Kenya, resources are limited and as such there is need to choose a model of regulation that 
easily be enforced. The Anglo- Saxon model requires channels of information dissemination 
that are efficient so that investors are updated on the code of corporate governance easily. 
“The Kenyan market though progressive needs to efficiently use the technology that is capable 
of properly informing the market as well as training personnel who will be able to use these 
machines.”136 
An effective institutional framework must be established if the Anglo-Saxon model, to thrive. 
Kenya as of the moment requires to adopt a model that is in line with the resources available 
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to ensure enforcement and proper monitoring of the capital markets. It must suit the needs and 
cultural undertones of the capital market. 
Political interference. 
An obstacle to the enhancement of corporate governance is the considerable presence of 
government controlled companies which are averse to good corporate governance.137 Listed 
companies were still sluggish in implementing the principles of good corporate governance. 
The report isolates government owned corporations as major culprits. The Government of 
Kenya is the controlling shareholder of several listed companies and exercises overwhelming 
influence in the appointment and removal of directors.  
“In Uchumi, the Ministry of Trade had a large shareholding, they sent a representative to sit 
on the board who lacked competency. The fact that the Ministry of Trade sat on the board 
would imply that they would be more vigilant but this was the contrary. The competency of 
directors should be set in stone. There should be a minimum number of training hours on 
corporate governance made mandatory to ensure good conduct and that the untouchables 
also face the consequences of the law.”138 
GERMAN MODEL 
In Germany, history shows that there was a reluctance towards the exercise of powers on a 
non- statutory basis. Their laws are backed with sanction in the event of non –compliance.139 
Compliance under in Section 161 of the German Stock Corporation Act140indicates that the 
Code of Corporate Governance is binding German company law has traditionally relied upon 
statutory regulation, in which the two-tier board model is firmly rooted13. 
There are three unique elements of the German model that distinguish it from the Anglo-
Saxon model. First, the German model prescribes two boards with separate members. The 
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management board consists of executives; and the supervisory board  is composed of the 
employees’ representative and the shareholders  representatives. 
The management and supervisory boards of listed companies have to declare  compliance 
with the Code every year as per section 161 of the German Companies Act,141 compliance is 
mandatory. 142 This publication is done alongside the  annual financial statements to the 
register of companies.143 
Currently, the shareholders and stakeholders within this model have easy access to 
information and the State ensures that the process for complaints due to non-compliance with 
the German Code of Corporate Governance is clearly outlined.The German command and 
control model is effective in imposing the standards of good corporate governance to all 
market participants with immediacy. The benefits of this model are as follows: 
The penalties of non-compliance are strongly passed from the government to investors and 
directors without any room for ambiguity. Civil and criminal sanctions are utilized when a 
company is not compliant with the Code, lowering corruption.144Secondly, this model creates 
uniformity and certainty. Finally, it compels corporations to maximize wealth in a responsible 
and principled manner that enables morality, ethics and corporate governance standards to be 
upheld. 
ANALYSIS OF MODELS WITHIN THE KENYAN CAPITAL MARKET. 
The Anglo-Saxon Model in comparison with the German model both exhibit some benefits 
and some weaknesses. Failure to comply with statutory rules calls for civil and or criminal 
sanctions within the German model which may increase deterrence in Kenya. In recent past, 
nation states utilize hard law to protect fundamental areas of the market to prevent or mitigate 
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the risks in letting the industry regulate itself. “The financial crisis of 1998 in the USA, was a 
clear example of what can happen if we leave the markets devoid of the government.”145 
Additionally, Germany uses law to ensure that the capital markets are protected especially 
stakeholders. The nation applies mandatory co- determination law to ensure that employees 
have a means to participate in the decision-making within corporations that are made in line 
with the policies on welfare. This is what we lack in Kenya, “employees seek job security 
above everything. The point when an employee will raise an issue on corporate governance 
effectuates his or her  immediate dismissal.”146   
The command and control may be seen to be too rigid and in the event of development and 
amendment the procedure and costs involved would be high. However, an enforced self-
regulation model entails market participants creating a corporate governance code for 
themselves which would ensure high commitment, fewer costs to the government and is 
practical to the company since it is made by the directors along with shareholders and 
stakeholders. 
Enforcement is a key factor needed in the model adopted within the Kenyan market. Thus far, 
enforcement is seen as the core of any effective regulatory system. As seen in the Kenyan 
market, voluntary self-regulation has not worked, coercive force is needed to ensure 
implementation takes place because without any incentive the participants will not comply 
with the set corporate governance guidelines.147 
The model adopted for the Kenyan market ought to have a rule and principle based aspect. It 
must combine both the statutory and non-statutory so as to be effective. Efficacy is measured 
by the level of compliance and at the moment for corporate governance principles to thrive 
within the Kenyan market there is a need to sanction non-compliance. 
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CONCLUSION 
The models of corporate governance were developed based on the culture, resources, history 
and technological advancement of these jurisdictions. Our code and governance structure 
must be based on our national, economic and social environment so as to meet the needs of 
the Kenyan market customized for their market. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Indeed, the current corporate governance implementing mechanisms in Kenya are inadequate, 
leading to insufficient accountability by directors when fulfilling their duty of promoting the 
success of the company as a whole. 
The Companies Act is ineffectual in relation to the mandate of director’s duties and it is based 
on the ‘shareholder’ in line with the Anglo-Saxon model as opposed to the German 
‘stakeholder’ model of corporate governance. The fact that compliance with the Guidelines is 
voluntary was intended to encourage compliance, but listed companies have not been taken 
them as part of their corporate culture. 
The body politic in Kenya has a great impact on the nomination and dispensation of duties by 
a board. This institution has had a large part to play on the  lack of transparency, disruption of 
the corporate governance framework and mechanisms by issuers of shares to the public and 
the CMA. 
According to the Uchumi case the CMA as the core regulator of the Markets has shown 
inadequacy and inefficiency in a number of areas. 
In the realm of drafting the Act, mirroring the 2015 Kenyan Companies Act to the UK 
Companies Act and  the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model without customizing any of them 
to fit  our markets doesn’t promote sound corporate governance.
148
 
Regulatory choices depend on the economic objectives of the state and its institutions. Self-
regulation is the first option, and when it fails, as it has in Kenya, enforced self-regulation can 
be introduced and then thereafter command and control can be imposed.149 “We should make 
the code mandatory, because unfortunately as Kenyans that is the only kind of regulation that 
shows efficacy. Indeed  politics and directorship is very intertwined in Kenya.”150 
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This paper thus recommends making the CMA functionally independent from the state so as 
to ensure that they efficiently implement the director’s duties. They should vet the directors 
after nomination but before presentation to the shareholders for election into the board. 
Additionally, a system that profiles directors that provides their competency level according 
to their role and levels of integrity should be envisioned. It will publicize any suspensions of 
directors from serving on any boards as easily accessed public information. This system will 
also bar an individual from serving more than 3 boards at the same time to ensure proper and 
concentrated dispensation of directors’ duties. 
There is need for a cohesive framework in the event that a director breaches his directorship 
duties. In order to effectively prosecute perpetrators of white collar crime, the functionality 
and competence of the CMA along with the Tribunal need revisal. As author, I recommend 
increasing the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the CMA and its tribunal through 
skilled personnel who have undergone specialized capacity building. This recommendation 
should however take place, after 3 years of devolved functionality from the government.This 
is upon revisal with established growth markers of devolved functionality and corporate 
governance practice.  
As regards the ambiguity of the term success in section 143, the general interpretation of the 
duty by directors was that it encapsulates the perpetual successive nature of the company. All 
decisions made should be for the success of the company, with the fact that the company must 
remain sustainable. When making these decisions, directors ought to take a mental flight and 
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KENYA COMPANIES ACT 2015 SECTION 143. 
This section is summarily coined as the Section143 duty of director to promote the success of 
the company. It mirrors the above section in the UK Companies Act as evidenced below; 
 
UK COMPANIES ACT SECTION 172 
Duty to promote the success of the company  
 
KENYA COMPANIES ACT 2015 
SECTION 143 
.  (1)  A director of a company must 
act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a 
whole, and in doing so have regard 
(amongst other matters) to—  
. . 
 
(1) A director of a company shall act in 
the way in which the director 
considers, in good faith, would 
promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole, 
and in so doing the director shall have 
regard to —  
 
. (a)  the likely consequences 
of any decision in the long 
term,   
 
. (a)  the long term consequences 
of any decision of the directors; 
  
 
. (b)  the interests of the 
company’s employees,   
 
. (b)  the interests of the 
employees of the company;   
 
. (c)  the need to foster the 
company’s business 
relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others,   
 
. (c)  the need to. foster the 
company's business 
relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others;   
 
. (d)  the impact of the 
company’s operations on the 
. (d)  the impact of the operations 
of the company on the 
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community and the 
environment,   
 
community and the 
environment;  the desirability 
of the company  
 
 
. (e)  the desirability of the 
company maintaining a 
reputation for high standards 
of business conduct, and   
 
. (e)to maintain a reputation for 
high standards of business 
conduct; and   
 
. (f)  the need to act fairly as 
between members of the 
company.   
 
(f) the need to act fairly as between the 
directors and the members of the 
company.  
 
. (2)  Where or to the extent that the 
purposes of the company consist of 
or include purposes other than the 
benefit of its members, subsection 
(1) has effect as if the reference to 
promoting the success of the 
company for the benefit of its 
members were to achieving those 
purposes.   
 
(2) If, or to the extent that, the purposes 
of the company consist of or include 
purposes other than the benefit of its 
members, subsection (1) has effect as if 
the reference to promoting the success 
of the company for the benefit of its 
members were to achieving those 
purposes.  
 
. 3)  The duty imposed by this section 
has effect subject to any enactment 
or rule of law requiring directors, in 
certain circumstances, to consider or 
act in the interests of creditors of the 
company 
(3) The duty imposed by this section 
has effect subject to any law requiring 
directors, in certain circumstances, to 
consider or act in the interests of 
creditors of the company. 
 
The table above shows; the statute was taken on without any adjustment. Section 143 has 
maintained all the sections, even those which the UK found to be weak in promoting 





Criticism on the agency relationship  
Figure 1: Comparison of the REMM and Economic Model of Man  
The criticism made on the agency relationship is the assumption made that the agent and 
principal are both rational utility maximizers. The  ‘model of man’151 and the Resourceful, 
Evaluative, 
Maximizing Model 
(REMM)152 acted as 
the underlying  
principles for the 
Agency Theory. These 
underpinnings 
primarily were of the 
notion that a human 
being is rational, self-
interested, and 
opportunistic153,a 
calculating individual who seeks to attain rewards and avoid punishments, especially financial 
ones.154The company is conceived as a nexus of contracts, and it is assumed that contracts can 
motivate, reward and supervise agents’ efforts155. These models were in line with the 
economic model of man in the corporate scene. The comparison is as shown below156  
                                               
151Jensen and Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ‘Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 4 
Journal of financial economics, (1967),305-360 
152 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 4, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320> 
153 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 4, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320> 
founded on Eisenhardt, 1989 
154 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 4, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320> 
founded on Donaldson and Davis, 1991 
155 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 4, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320> 
founded on Hoskisson et al., 1999 
156 Smith T, ‘Agency Theory and Its Consequences; A study of the unintended effect of Agency Theory on Risk 





Diagrammatical representation that attempts to take the reader through the decision making 
process made by the director in choosing which model to take on. 
 
Figure 2: Principal- Manager choice 
model.157 
The above Principal-Manager choice 
model, reflects two individuals 
choosing to become either a steward or 
agent. The criticism made on this 
analysis of decision is that it assumes 
the decision is made at a single point, 
it is static. Contrarily, dynamic 
relationships that are long term and 
require a large amount of trust and 
reciprocity from the principal and 
manager are not characterized by the 
agency model which leaves either party betrayed when the other acts in an opportunistic 
nature. What has been advocated for with this model is the need for a deeper understanding 
between the dynamic interaction between agents and stewards as both parties oscillate 
between the two models as the long term dynamic relationship unfolds.158 It has been argued 
that virtuousness complements rationality by controlling the spontaneous impulse to pursue 
pure extrinsic results, as opposed to transcendent results. This theory can then be posited as 
the ‘soft’ law in corporate governance, but can equally be seen as acting as the spirit behind 
statute primarily directorship duties. 
  
                                               
157 Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 7, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295320>see also Davis Schoorman and Donaldson 1997 
158Pastoriza D and  Arino M, “When Agents Become Stewards: Introducing learning in the stewardship 
theory”,1st IESE Conference,Barcelona, 2008, 7, 






THE COMPANIES ACT No. 17 of 2015  
Division 3. The duties run from Section 140 to Section 150.  
The duties are as follows159: 
Section 140: Scope and nature of general duties 
Section 141: Director's right to protest against removal. 
Section 142: Duty of director to act within powers. 
Section 143: Duty of director to promote the success of the company. 
Section 144: Duty of director to exercise independent judgment. 
Section 145: Duty of director to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. 
Section 146: Duty of director to avoid conflicts of interest. 
Section 147: Duty not to accept benefits from third parties. 
Section 148: Civil consequences of breach of general duties. 
Section 149: Cases within more than one of the general duties. 
Section 150: Consent, approval or authorization by members. 
  
                                               




Uchumi’s Timeframe before 2011 
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The following are the interview questions that were asked in performance of Chapter 4 of the 
study. The interviewees either signed consent forms or verbally agreed to have their words 
quoted directly, with the exception of interviewee 7.4 below who only agreed to be quoted 
when orally defending my paper. 
Sample of nature of questions 
Questions 
1. First off, which corporate governance theory have you encountered as widely 
practiced in the Boards you have served? 
 
2. Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public 2015, 
opted to defer from the ‘comply or explain’ approach to the ‘apply or explain’ 
approach.  
 
a. How does this principle based approach change the operations of board of 
directors in strive towards sound corporate governance? 
b. What would be the effect of making this code mandatory? 
 
3. What would be the effect on boards and directors if the functions of the CMA were to 
be broadened and devolved from the Treasury? 
 
4. In your years of experience, what is the role played by politics within the Board of 
Directors? 
 
5. In terms of policy making and practice, through the Judiciary and CMA Tribunal , 
what should be done to eradicate white collar crime conducted by directors and 
therefore mitigate the number of corporate scandals? 
 
6. Do you think the CMA is an effective regulator of industry? 
 
7. Companies Act 2015 Section 143; ‘Duty of the director  to Promote the success of the 





7.1  Interview with Mr. Kabage Karanja 
9th January,2017 
The Insurance Centre, 
Rose Ave, Off Dennis Pritt Rd. 
Mr. Kabage has held several positions of leadership as a director of several boards such as the 
Group Chairman of Pacific Insurance Brokers (EA) Ltd, First Reinsurance Brokers Ltd 
(FirstRe), Chairman - Association of Insurance Brokers of Kenya (AIBK), Secretary of 
Insurance Institute of Kenya (IIK), Chairman of the Communication Commission of Kenya, 
Chairmanship capacities of three key private sectors; Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE), 
Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) and Kenya Business Council (KBC).  
He has served as Commissioner with Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) which is 
responsible for Electricity, Petroleum and Renewable energy and has been a member of the 
Kenya Nuclear Electricity Board.  
7.2 Interview with Mr. Francis Kang'ata Kiragu 
9TH January, 2017 
Strathmore Law School 
Mr. Francis Kangata has had vast experience as the Marketing and Corporate Sales Manager 
in Uchumi Ltd. He was responsible for specialty partners as well as fresh produce and bakery 
units which he also managed during his tenure as Branch Operations Manager. He has 
significant experience in branch operations having worked as Branch Manager at Sarit Centre 
in Westlands, and Langata Hyper.  
 
7.3 Interview with Professor Wainaina Gituro 
20th December 2016 
Parklands Sports Club,  
Nairobi, Kenya. 
Director of the Social and Political Pillars under the Vision 2030 Delivery Secretariat, board 
member of Capital Market Authority and board committee member at Management 
University of Africa. 
7.4  Interview with past lead legal consultant in Uchumi Supermarkets. 
Tuesday 10th January 2017 at 10:30 am 
The interviewee was the principal legal counsel in charge of all board and shareholder 
matters and in charge of Public Relation and Corporate Social Responsibility. 
 
